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Abstract 
This chapter examines the motives driving Saudi policies against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in the Syria 
crisis. Amid the transformation of the Syrian uprisings into a civil war in the post-2011 period, the 
Saudi Kingdom’s policies toward the Syria crisis have not been static. Whereas the Kingdom initially 
adopted a policy of accommodation that ensures the survival of Bashar al-Assad through reforms, it 
later adopted policies with the intent of overthrowing the Syrian regime. Since august 2011, the Saudi 
Kingdom has been determined to depose al-Assad while actively supporting several opposition groups 
in Syria through diplomatic, military, and financial means. Often portrayed as either driven by sectarian 
factors or traditional strategic concerns, the dynamics of the Saudi involvement in Syria can be instead 
explained as part of a larger bid for regional leadership, fusing ideational and material elements.  
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Introduction 
Ever since the formation of the modern states of Syria and Saudi Arabia, the relationship between the 
two countries has constituted a ‘paradox’ in Middle East international relations. One the one hand, the 
two have often stood on opposing sides; represented diametrically opposing ideologies; clashed through 
proxies across the region; and taken divergent alliance decisions during major regional wars. On the 
other hand, the relationship between the al-Assad regime and the Al Saud evolved over time into an 
enduring entente, at times reaching the status of an uneasy alliance that shaped inter-Arab politics over 
decades. For example, in the last two decades, and particularly since the 2003 Iraq War, Syria has been 
a constituent part of the so-called ‘resistance axis’, including Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.1 The Saudi 
Kingdom, meanwhile, has been in the opposing camp, alongside Egypt and Jordan.2 Nevertheless, the 
Saudi Kingdom maintained outwardly amicable relations with the al-Assad regime. The Al Saud had 
long calculated that isolating the al-Assad regime or trying to overthrow it would be counterproductive, 
likely leading to its further radicalisation and the consolidation of its alliance with Iran. Although former 
President Hafiz al-Assad maintained relatively amicable relations with the Saudi Kingdom, especially 
after al-Assad’s decision to join the US coalition during the Gulf War (1990-91), the relationship under 
Bashar al-Assad has been less cordial. Initially, when Bashar succeeded his father in 2000, the Saudi 
Kingdom supported the young ruler and saw an opportunity to pull Syria away from Iran. With the 
assassination of Rafik al-Hariri in Lebanon in 2005, the relationship between al-Assad and King 
Abdullah soured, reaching a nadir with al-Assad calling King Abdullah and other Arab leaders ‘half-
men’ for not supporting Lebanon during the 2006 Lebanon War.3 Still, despite the strains in their 
relationship following the 2006 Lebanon war and the 2009 Gaza war, prior to 2011 the Kingdom 
expressed willingness for a détente with Bashar al-Assad.4 
 When the Syrian uprisings ignited in March 2011, the Saudis were unsure of the course to adopt 
and were rather cautious in their approach toward the crisis. Some scholars have attributed the 
Kingdom’s initial cautious reaction to domestic factors. In the context of the Arab Uprisings, the 
primary goal of the Kingdom was to prevent the protests from reaching the Gulf.5 Consequently, the 
Saudis played the role of a counterrevolutionary force opposing any change to their long-lasting allies 
in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain.6 These counterrevolutionary efforts intensified further with the 
rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in North Africa. Additionally, the Saudis perceived al-Assad 
to be a resilient leader who survived isolation, rebellion, and US policies in Iraq; he earned further good 
will from the Kingdom by refraining from condemning the Saudi intervention in Bahrain in March 
2011. As a result, during the early stages of the Syrian uprisings, Saudi Arabia remained favourable to 
al-Assad’s regime and encouraged al-Assad adopt reform and desist repressing protests. The initial 
approach was to support al-Assad in exchange for limited concessions, mainly distancing Syria from 
Iran. King Abdullah sent his son Abdulaziz bin Abdullah Al Saud, the then deputy minister of foreign 
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affairs, to meet with Bashar al-Assad three times in an attempt to offset Iranian influence over Syria. 
On all three occasions, however,  al-Assad refused to meet with Abdulaziz, rendering the Saudi 
initiative futile.7 
Partly as a result of these frustrated policies, by late summer 2011 the Saudi approach toward 
the Syria crisis shifted from attempting to bring Syria under Saudi influence to seeking the overthrow 
of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As it became clear that al-Assad was unable to deal with the crisis despite 
the heavy-handed tactics, the Saudi Kingdom perceived the geostrategic opportunity to disrupt the 
Syria-Iran axis. In August 2011, King Abdullah issued a warning indicating this radical shift in the 
Saudi approach towards the Syrian regime: 
What is happening in Syria is not acceptable for Saudi Arabia (...) Syria should think wisely 
before it’s too late and issue and enact reforms that are not merely promises but actual reforms. 
Either it chooses wisdom on its own, or it will be pulled down into the depths of turmoil and 
loss. 8 
Following this warning, the Saudi Kingdom withdrew its ambassador to Damascus. Against 
the history of containment and implicit entente between the Saudi Kingdom and the Syrian regime, the 
decision to overthrow al-Assad constituted an important development in Saudi policies in the region. 
Conveying the impression of intervening in the conflict for humanitarian purposes, King Abdullah 
urged al-Assad ‘to stop the killing machine’.9 In addition, the Saudi Kingdom adopted several strategies 
and tactics over time to overthrow al-Assad regime, including10 supporting the Syrian National Council 
(SNC); playing a dominant role in the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition 
Forces (SOC); arming the Free Syrian Army (FSA); supporting the Islamic Front; pledging to sent 
troops to Syria; and hosting various Syrian armed groups in 2015.11 Despite the evolution of the conflict 
and the rise of extremist groups — particularly Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State (IS) — the Saudis 
remained determined to depose al-Assad. Amid international talks intended to unite efforts in fighting 
the rise of extremism, Saudi Foreign Minister Al-Jubeir insisted that ‘Bashar al-Assad must go or face 
military option’.12 Importantly, despite changes in Saudi leadership in 2015, Saudi foreign policy 
towards the Syria crisis has remained largely unchanged.  
 This chapter examines the motives driving Saudi policies against al-Assad’s regime while 
exploring the key changes in these policies over the period from 2011 to 2017. The existing literature 
presents various explanations of the Saudi behaviour in the Syria crisis. The first strand of explanations 
present a primordial reading of the conflict. Scholars of this approach characterize the war as 
fundamentally a sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shiites on both domestic and regional levels, 
where regional actors from both sects have contributed to fuelling this perception.13 These scholars have 
relied on primordial approaches to identity formation in analysing the Sunni–Shiite divide as the 
primary driver of the conflict. The second strand in the literature belong to the realist view in 
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International Relations. with the involvement of several international and regional actors, namely 
Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah, the Syria crisis is often characterised as a proxy war. Realist scholars focus 
on geopolitical factors, especially the troubled relationship between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
Accordingly, the Syrian civil war is viewed as a proxy war where Saudi Arabia and Iran are vying for 
regional influence.  
This chapter seeks to challenge both primordial and realist explanations of Saudi behaviour 
while offering a comprehensive approach towards understanding what appears to be a growing Saudi 
assertiveness against Bashar al-Assad's regime amidst the increasing intensity of threats from extremist 
groups. The chapter argues that the dynamics of the Saudi involvement in Syria can be understood as 
part of a larger regional contest over leadership, which fuses ideational and material elements. Drawing 
on the concept of recognition in international relations, I argue that the Saudis have been struggling to 
acquire recognition for their identity narrative claiming the leadership of Sunni Islam in the region. This 
quest for recognition is reinforced and enabled by growing Saudi military and economic capabilities. 
As the Saudis have, so far, failed to acquire this aspired recognition from regional and international 
actors, their reaction has been aggressive and violent in an attempt to achieve the desired 
acknowledgment of their power and rank by force if necessary.   
The chapter is divided into three sections.  First, while I examine alternative explanations of 
Saudi involvement in the Syrian conflict, I present the conceptual framework that I use in support of 
my argument, outlining the concept of recognition and how it operates in state behaviour at the 
international level. Second, I present an analysis of Saudi involvement in the Syrian conflict as part of 
its larger regional ambitions in the Middle East. Third, I trace the key changes in Saudi policies towards 
war-torn Syria over time, from overt diplomatic actions to military assistance to anti-Assad groups. I 
also explore the impact these policies have had on the Syria crisis and shaped the conflict’s evolution 
in the process.  
Theorising Saudi Policy in Syria 
Understanding the dynamics of Saudi Arabia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict requires an 
examination of the existing explanations. While few analysts dispute the centrality of Saudi Arabia’s 
role in the Syria crisis, there is, however, scholarly disagreement on the factors shaping its behaviour 
towards al-Assad. Simply put, there are two divergent explanations. The most common of these is 
sectarian, treating the Sunni–Shiite divide as a primary factor driving Saudi animosity against al-Assad 
and his allies — namely Iran and Hezbollah. The second explanation adopts a realist perspective, 
according to which the Syrian conflict is a proxy war, in which Saudi-Iranian rivalry play a determining 
role, with sectarian narratives as mere instruments of a power struggle.  
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 Although observers continue to stress that multiple factors shape Saudi policies in Syria, the 
Sunni–Shiite divide has come to dominate media analyses14 and policy reports.15 These analyses belong 
to a primordial approach that emphasises culture and identity as the determinants of conflict and 
cooperation between actors. Primordialists view the Sunni–Shiite divide as the core conflict dominating 
the region, originating in the seventh century and still pertaining to current political dynamics.16 It is 
true that sectarianism is an undeniable element in Saudi policies generally speaking.17 In the 1980s, the 
most important period of sectarian bitterness growing out of the challenge of the Iranian Islamic 
Revolution (1979) to the Sunni Arab monarchies, the Kingdom actively used the Sunni–Shiite divide 
to counter the revolutionary message of Ayatollah Khomeini.18 Whereas there was no official sectarian 
discourse, the Kingdom tacitly endorsed sectarian narratives at the time.19 As Jones claims, ‘managing 
and strategically deploying anti-Shiism is […] an important part of [King Abdullah’s] government 
political calculus’.20  
Yet, an exclusive focus on sectarianism as a motive seriously distorts the analysis of Saudi 
policies in Syria, and elsewhere. Although the Kingdom has manipulated sectarian discourses to 
legitimise its regional policies — especially in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Iraq — the motives driving 
these policies are far from sectarian. Riyadh has crossed the sectarian fault line in seeking regional allies 
and proxies across the region, Syria included. Despite opposing some groups with a Shiite background 
— such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon — the Saudis have not limited their 
alliances to fellow Sunnis, nor have they supported every Sunni group in the Middle East. In Iraq, 
Riyadh backed secular parties during the elections of 2005 and 2010, such as the Iraqiya party led by 
Iyad Allawi. From a sectarian perspective, the Muslim Brotherhood was the natural ally of Saudi Arabia 
in Syria and Egypt. Nevertheless, the Kingdom demonised the Brotherhood in Egypt, Tunisia, and 
across the Gulf.21 Similarly, sectarianism was hardly the basis upon which the Saudis have sought 
regional allies or local proxies in Syria.22 Initially, the Saudis supported the least sectarian groups 
involved in the conflict — such as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Following the failure of the FSA in 
making military progress, the Saudis moved to supporting the Islamic Front as well as other Salafi 
groups (For an overview of the different Syrian rebel groups, cf. BBC News).23  
 The second common explanation of Saudi policies adopts a realist approach. Realists often 
argue that states are seeking security and survival and that their decision in resorting to armed violence 
is based on a rational cost-benefit analysis.24 Realist scholars, therefore, argue that grasping the nature 
of the Iranian-Saudi struggle is central to understanding Saudi policies in Syria. The conflict in Syria is 
explained as an extension of the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.25 The Saudi Kingdom has 
made it clear that it perceives the Syria-Iran-Hezbollah axis as a source of threat and instability in the 
region. From a realist perspective, this threat perception is driven by geopolitical interests, where 
identities are only instruments masking geopolitical rivalry over influence in the Gulf, Lebanon, and 
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Iraq.26 From this point of view, Riyadh considers a regime change in Syria to be a crucial opportunity 
to weaken Iran’s influence in the region and abolish the Syria-Iran axis. As a Saudi official stated, ‘Syria 
is Iran’s entry into the Arab world […] take down al-Assad and you inflict a strategic blow on Iran’.27  
 Although this realist view of the conflict is understandably convenient, it is analytically 
problematic. A pure geostrategic explanation claims that actors not only use material means to achieve 
their goals but that they also have fixed preferences, namely the maximisation of power and security. 
Their interests are determined by and would shift with changes in the relative power distribution. 
Strategic explanations cannot account for the shift in Saudi intentions towards al-Assad. Until August 
2011, the Saudi Kingdom has pursued a regional policy favouring stability, including the survival of 
the al-Assad regime. In this context, strategic explanations alone cannot explain why the Saudis initially 
supported the al-Assad regime after the 2011 uprising and then switched to a policy dedicated to  
overthrowing him (since August 2011). While the 2011 Arab uprisings have reinforced the prevailing 
view that Iran is finding opportunities in Arab instability to fulfil its ambitions of regional hegemony, 
the regional configuration provides serious constraints on Iran’s ability to project its power. According 
to at least some scholars, Iran’s military capabilities are limited and often exaggerated.28 Iran’s 
conventional military capabilities are far less than those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states.29 In 2014, it was estimated that the GCC states spent US$ 114 billion on defence compared to 
Iran’s 16 billion. Moreover, the GCC states have a significant qualitative advantage, in that US support 
and technology transfer to the GCC is far more superior.30 In short, the Syrian-Iranian axis has persisted 
over decades, and the balance of military capabilities did not change during the post-2011 order, making 
a realist explanation of Saudi policy shifts problematic.   
Against this backdrop, this chapter claims that neither pure strategic interests nor solely 
sectarian elements explain Saudi policies in Syria. Instead, the chapter offers a reading of the 
Kingdom’s involvement in Syria as a bid for regional leadership fusing material and social elements of 
power contestation in the Middle East. The sudden possibility of al-Assad’s fall emerged as an 
opportunity for the Kingdom to destroy the Syria-Iran axis and assert its regional leadership in the 
region. The remainder of this section examines the concept of ‘recognition’ as a theoretical lens that 
can provide a comprehensive explanation of Saudi policies in the Syria crisis. I present the ‘recognition’ 
concept by integrating a ‘thin constructivist’ perspective31 into the strategic dimension of security 
interests. I argue here that the quest for recognition of regional status and the search for material power 
and security usually go hand in hand and reinforce each other. On the one hand, aspiration for symbolic 
superiority invites and encourages the quest for material power. On the other hand, recognition can 
serve as an instrument to advance material interests. In empirical terms, the Saudi Kingdom pursued 
aggressive policies in Syria with an eye toward establishing itself as a regional leader. At the same time, 
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the Kingdom’s quest for such leadership is inextricably related to material capabilities and the pursuit 
of physical security.  
Studies in philosophy,32 social psychology,33 sociology,34 and political science35 have 
demonstrated the importance of nonmaterial needs in social relations. Identity has an intersubjective 
nature, i.e., actors operating in a social system need to present an identity narrative that describes who 
they are and where they stand in relation to others; they also need to have this narrative accepted by 
others around them.  In this sense, actors are in constant negotiation with the surrounding social 
structure. In the realm of international relations, this theoretical viewpoint suggests that states have a 
need to be recognised. Furthermore, as states are in a relentless struggle to form their identity and to 
force others to affirm their subjective narratives, recognition is related to the quest for material power. 
The relationship between symbolic and physical dimensions of power is twofold. The first aspect 
exhibits an instrumental, utilitarian logic, according to which recognition advances material interests.36 
States seek recognition to in order to demonstrate their power and achieve dominance. In other words, 
the demonstration of superiority might itself be a source of material power.37 The second logic is 
psychological, according to which recognition is an intrinsic need related to human nature — including 
other symbolic dimensions such as honour, prestige, glory, or reputation.38 Therefore, material interests 
can be means to achieve this human motive intrinsic to the elites responsible for states’ foreign policy.39  
It should be noted that any apparent dichotomy between instrumental and psychological logics is 
artificial. Symbolic and material dimensions of power go hand in hand. States have needs for material 
power as well as recognition. Material and symbolic dimensions of power can interact in various ways. 
States’ aspirations for symbolic superiority and recognition encourage the quest for material power. It 
is easier to force others to recognise one’s identity narrative when one possesses the means. In the 
meantime, the demonstration of power may be a source of material power. Any form of material power 
requires an intersubjective agreement on its reality.40 Highlighting these symbolic and material 
dimensions of recognition, scholars argue that the lack of ‘recognition’ can lead to aggressive reactions. 
In some cases, states stand firmly in defense of their self-description and are ready to fight to prove that 
it is correct.41 As recognition is inextricably related to material power, actors can perceive a lack of 
recognition as a threat to their material ambitions. The urge to redress this insufficient status recognition 
can result in violence.42  
This above theoretical framework will provide an explanation unreavelling the drivers of Saudi 
policies in Syria. In the next section, I examine the growing material capabilities of the Kingdom and 
how it reinforced Saudi claim of leadership. In the meantime, the constant struggle of the Saudi regime 
to be recognised as a leading actor has been a failure, igniting violent and aggressive reactions, 
especially in Syria. 
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Drivers of Saudi Policies in Syria 
By employing the concept of ‘recognition’, this study posits that the Saudis, for quite some time, have 
felt that their economic wealth and religious status entitle them to a top-rank status in the regional 
system. This perception of power has emerged alongside a hubristic identity narrative claiming Saudi 
religious and normative superiority in the Arab world, i.e., the leadership of Sunni Islam. Nevertheless, 
this narrative of superiority has not been widely recognised and has, in fact, been challenged by other 
Sunni actors. In response, the Saudis have felt the urge to redress the insufficient status recognition 
through an aggressive countermeasure in Syria, and recently in Yemen.  
The oil-rich Kingdom wields far greater influence and power today than it did half a century 
ago. Based on its significant fiscal resources and growing military capabilities, the Kingdom has 
adopted a self-depiction of a regional power shaping outcomes in the Middle East. Saudi material power 
has two dimensions: fiscal and military. Donating money for political purposes to other regimes and 
groups throughout the Middle East has been a tradition referred to as Saudi Riyalpolitik. In addition, 
the Kingdom has significantly increased its military capabilities. Military spending has more than 
doubled in the last decade, reaching US$ 67 billion per year.43 As recent estimates from the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) show, the Saudi Kingdom is now fourth in line after the 
United States, China, and Russia in military spending. De facto, the Kingdom is the biggest buyer of 
foreign weapons and security systems on the globe.44 Although there are considerable doubts regarding 
the real efficiency of Saudi military forces, the Kingdom has been able to demonstrate its capabilities 
in Libya, Yemen, and Bahrain.  
Saudi decisions since the outbreak of the Arab uprisings provide strong evidence that the 
Kingdom wants to be perceived as a regional actor shaping the course of events according to own 
preferences and interests, as the post-2011 order has provided the Kingdom with the opportunity to 
expand its power and influence across the region. In the present situation, it has been clear that no other 
Arab country is capable of achieving the status of dominant or sole regional leadership, particularly as 
Egypt became focused on its domestic problems and Syria descended into civil war. From this point of 
view, it might be argued that Saudi Arabia has sought to fill this wide open void in Arab power.  
Nevertheless, Saudi strategy of supporting the Syrian rebels is in fact linked to its seemingly waning 
regional influence in favour of non-Arab actors, namely Iran and Turkey. On the one hand, Riyadh has 
constantly perceived Iran’s influence in the region to be threatening, especially through its influence in 
Iraq, Lebanon, and the Palestinian territories.45 On the other hand, Turkey has competed with the Saudis 
on many regional issues, especially the thorny question of the  Muslim Brotherhood’s position in Egypt. 
In this context, the Syrian conflict presented an opportunity for the Saudis to assert their material power 
in the Middle East and convey the image of a regional power capable of shaping outcomes in its 
surrounding. Overthrowing al-Assad and replacing it with a friendly regime to the Saudis meant further 
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isolating Iran and depriving it of its main ally. Moreover, as Syria is located at the heart of the Arab 
world, the establishment of an allied regime would enable the Saudis to exert more influence in Iraq 
and Lebanon.46 
 To promote its regional status further, the Saudi Kingdom has relied on its religious status as 
the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques to promote its self-ascribed status as the symbolic leader of 
the Sunni and Muslim worlds. This type of identity has in fact granted historically the Kingdom a 
symbolic status in the region. The tremendous amount of financial resources and the growth in the 
Kingdom’s military capabilities over the past decades has contributed to the Saudi status consciousness, 
resulting in the elites’ feelings that the state is treated far below their ‘appropriate’ status, as regional 
and international actors have not recognized the acclaimed Saudi status of de facto regional leadership. 
I argue that this lack of recognition is at the origin of what scholars have observed as a ‘shift from 
traditionally cautious and conciliatory [Saudi] foreign and regional policy towards a sharper affirmation 
of [Saudi] interests’.47 In the context of the Syrian crisis, the Saudis saw deposing al-Assad as an 
opportunity to redress this situation, through providing a definitive demonstration of their influence and 
capabilities in the Middle East. 
While the Saudis have attempted to assert themselves as regional leaders, both regional and 
international actors have challenged this Saudi narrative of superiority. For example, in the Gulf, the 
Saudis sent troops to support its Bahraini ally King Hamad Al Khalifa against internal protests, which 
signalled Saudi determination to take the lead in protecting the Gulf from the effects of the Arab 
uprisings.48 Moreover, Saudi Arabia proposed that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) be expanded 
to include Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt, an idea that was not welcomed by all GCC members.49 On 
many occasions, the Saudis proposed the institutionalisation of an expanded, tighter, and greater union 
of the GCC under their command. King Abdullah's proposals for greater political integration in the Gulf 
collapsed with Oman's opposition and Kuwait's reluctance. In December 2013, Oman opposed Saudi 
plans for a unified command structure for the armed forces of the six states.50 Kuwait refused to sign a 
GCC internal security pact, as it will compromise its political liberalism and its exceptional 
constitutional principles within the Gulf.51 The emergence of Qatari-Emirati animosity over Libya and 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt made Saudi ambitions further unattainable.52 The most important 
challenge to the Saudi attempt of acquiring the recognition of Saudi regional status in the Gulf is Qatar’s 
foreign policy that explicitly opposed Saudi policies in Egypt and Syria. 
The Saudi claim of regional leadership received another hit as the Kingdom failed to build a 
coalition against Iran.53 The Iranian influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon has long rankled the Saudis, 
as it empirically counteracted the Kingdom’s claim to regional hegemony. The Kingdom has, in recent 
years, attempted to counter the vexing Iranian presence by relying on its Islamic identity, and placing 
itself at the centre of a regional coalition (or in sectarian terms a ‘Sunni’ coalition) aimed against Shiite 
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Iran. Yet, despite these efforts, every GCC state except Saudi Arabia and Bahrain approved the interim 
nuclear agreement between the US and Iran in November 2013 and received Iran’s foreign minister.54 
Furthermore, Oman secretly hosted the initial preliminarily deals between Iran and the United States, 
which led the nuclear talks. Turkey, which seemed a natural member of a ‘Sunni’ coalition against Iran, 
challenged the Saudi Kingdom’s policies towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. These apparent 
rejections of its bid for leadership moved the Saudis to feel that regional actors did not ‘appropriately’ 
recognise their self-ascribed status. As Khalid al-Dakhil, a prominent Saudi sociologist and 
commentator stated: ‘During King Abdullah, we did not have a foreign policy, and just watched events 
unfold in front of our eyes’.55 This need for recognition has even intensified under the leadership of 
King Salman. Some observers speculate that the new leadership blames the late King Abdullah’s 
cautious foreign policy for the loss of the Kingdom’s prestige and its status misrecognition.  
Furthermore, the Arab uprisings challenged not only the Kingdom’s regional status (whether self-
perceived or real) as the leader of Sunni Islam but also the credibility of its identity narrative. The rise 
of the Muslim Brotherhood across the region as an alternative to the collapsing regimes constituted an 
important challenge to the Kingdom’s narrative as the leader of Sunni Islam.56 In response, the Kingdom 
attempted to build a regional coalition criminalising the group and pressuring other regional actors in 
joining its own proclamation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Nevertheless, some 
states with strong connections with the Brotherhood — such as Jordan and Kuwait — refused to comply 
with these Saudi demands.57 Meanwhile, by scoring important victories in Iraq and Syria, the ‘Islamic 
State’ (IS) put the Saudi claim of Sunni leadership under further pressure. The Kingdom’s quest to place 
itself at the centre of a regional coalition to counter ISIS did not resonate in the region. In December 
2015, the Saudis announced a counterterrorism coalition including 34 Muslim countries. Yet, the main 
countries involved in the conflict — namely Iran, Syria, and Iraq — did not join the coalition, which 
constituted a blow to the Kingdom’s quest for regional leadership.58 
Moving to another level of analysis, internationally, the Kingdom has felt that its regional 
interests and ambitions have been met with ‘disrespect’, especially from the United States. Since its 
foundation, the Kingdom has relied on external powers, first the British, and then the United States, to 
ensure its security. Such dependence was exemplified in 1990 when the Kingdom called the United 
States to protect them from Saddam Hussein who invaded and annexed Kuwait. Following the 2011 
uprisings, the Saudis became convinced that the divergence between Riyadh and Washington has 
hindered the Kingdom's regional interests. The Saudis perceived Obama's policies in the region not 
only as abandoning the US historical responsibilities towards preserving the Kingdom's security but 
also as a clear disrespect to the Kingdom’s interests.59 With the 2011 Arab uprisings, the US reluctance 
to support long-lived autocrats in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen has caused a rift in US-Saudi relations. 
The Kingdom felt the need to shape an independent foreign policy in the region. Such drive became 
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further confirmed following the US reluctance to intervene in Syria and its attempt to amend its policies 
toward Iran, the Saudi Kingdom discarded its traditional defence doctrine and attempted to rely on its 
own resources for security. Furthermore, the nuclear deals with Iran showed that US interests 
overlapped with Iranian ones in fighting Sunni extremism in Iraq and Syria. In this context, insisting 
on deposing al-Assad constitutes a reaction from the Saudis to redress their claim of recognition as a 
regional power able to control outcomes in the region. The following section examines the various tools 
deployed by the Saudi Kingdom in Syria and how they evolved over the course of the crisis. 
Furthermore, the section discusses the implications of Saudi policies on the Syria crisis. 
Instruments of Saudi Policies and Their Implications 
In its endeavour to depose al-Assad, the Saudi Kingdom deployed various policies: diplomatic, 
financial, and ideational. The initial tool involved deploying diplomatic and economic pressure on al-
Assad. After withdrawing its ambassador from Damascus in August 2011, the Saudi Kingdom played 
an active role in the Arab League to pressure al-Assad to resign.60 Although the Syrian regime initially 
showed a willingness to conform to the League's demands, the domestic violence continued to escalate. 
Following the failure to implement this plan, the Saudi Kingdom engaged actively with the Arab League 
to propose the ‘Arab Peace Plan Initiative' in November 2011, a plan centered on the hand-over of 
power from al-Assad to his deputy and a unity government.61 Simultaneously, the League imposed 
economic sanctions on Syria. Given the close economic ties between Iraq, Lebanon, Iran, and Syria, 
these sanctions were symbolic rather than playing an effective role in pressuring al-Assad.62 
Deeming diplomacy at the regional level inefficient, the Saudis called upon the international 
community for greater international pressure against al-Assad while encouraging the US to take an 
active role and call for a military intervention. In January 2012, Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-
Faisal, accused the Syrian regime of acting in bad faith in not implementing the Arab League’s proposal. 
Furthermore, the Kingdom, alongside Qatar, called for international action in Syria, with Prince Saud 
al-Faisal issuing a statement: ‘We are calling on the international community to bear its responsibility, 
and that includes our brothers in Islamic states and our friends in Russia, China, Europe, and the United 
States’.63  
When the al-Assad regime reportedly used chemical weapons in August 2013, the Arab Gulf 
countries — led by Saudi Arabia — tried to persuade Washington that al-Assad has crossed the line set 
by President Obama and that military intervention deposing him was the most appropriate response. 
Furthermore, Saudi intelligence presented the US with proof in February 2013 that the Syrian regime 
has deployed chemical weapons.64 Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal claimed that: ‘Any opposition 
to any international action would only encourage Damascus to move forward with committing its 
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crimes and using all weapons of mass destruction’.65 But this call for Western intervention created a 
divide among Arab states. Whereas Saudi Arabia and Qatar among other GCC countries perceived such 
intervention as necessary, Algeria, Iraq, and Lebanon were not convinced. In addition, Egypt under 
President Mohamed Morsi announced its reluctance to support military intervention in Syria. In the 
meantime, the United States under Obama remained reluctant to adopt direct military action aimed at 
toppling al-Assad.66  
With the failure of using diplomatic means to exert substantial pressure over the al-Assad regime, the 
Saudi Kingdom resorted to other instruments, privileging military and political pressure. Yet, 
diplomatic means returned to the forefront, intermittently at least, during later stages of the conflict. In 
2014, the US swayed the Saudis to join the diplomatic track and engage with the UN-sponsored Geneva 
II peace process.67 In 2017, a new round of Russian and Turkish-backed negotiations was launched in 
Astana, Kazakhstan. This round was mainly driven by Russia, Turkey, and Iran with limited influence 
from the US, reflecting the shift in the balance of power in the war.68 In this context, the Saudi Kingdom 
did not participated in the conference while Saudi media outlets characterised the gathering as an 
‘attempt by regional actors to pursue their own interests’.69 
Alongside diplomatic means, the Kingdom has employed its traditional policies of using 
financial resources to influence the outcome of Syria crisis. Indeed, the fortification of Riyalpolitik has 
risen to new heights in the Syrian conflict. In January 2012, due to the failure of the sanctions to exert 
significant pressure on al-Assad, the Saudis started giving financial support to the Syrian National 
Council (SNC). As the crisis in Syria descended into an armed conflict, the Saudis departed from 
Western policies and have, since February 2012, forcefully supported the rebels.70 In the process, the 
Saudi rulers relied on personal ties and tribal connections to distribute arms and funds; in the 
background, the Kingdom relied on the personal contacts of Intelligence Chief Prince Bindar bin 
Sultan.71 When the US secretly began arming Syrian rebels in 2013, it relied on Saudi Arabia as its 
primary partner and the largest contributor, among other regional actors, in its operations in Syria. 
Whereas the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) took the lead in training the rebels, the Saudi 
intelligence agency provided money and weapons, including anti-tank missiles.72 
These Saudi policies in Syria has created other challenges to the Kingdom at the regional level. 
A rift with other Gulf states, Qatar in particular, emerged over the Syria crisis. Riyadh and Doha chose 
to support competing factions within the SNC, and after 2012, the National Coalition for Syria 
Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC). Whereas Saudi Arabia has relied on tribal ties, Qatar has 
used its pre-existing links with the Muslim Brotherhood to play an influential role in Syria. Moaz al-
Khatib, first president of the SOC, resigned after five months due to external interference. Since his 
resignation, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar began to push their affiliated clients in prominent positions. 
Qatar promoted its Brotherhood candidate, Ghassan Hitto, causing nine members of SOC to resign. 
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From July 2013 to July 2014, Riyahd managed to sustain its own client, Ahmed Jarba, as president of 
the SOC, considered to be Riyadh's client.  
These divisions have been more visible and pronounced over the support of armed groups. 
Initially, the Saudis supported the FSA until 2013, even going so far as to pay salaries.73 With the 
perceived weakness of the FSA in making any progress against al-Assad, the Saudis shifted their 
support to Jaysh al-Islam (the Army of Islam or JAI), a group of Salafists that operates independently 
from the FSA.74 In November 2013, JAI along with other Islamist militias formed the Islamic Front, 
both dissociating themselves from FSA and opposing ISIS. In the meantime, Qatar initially backed 
groups affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Liwa al-Tawhid, part of the FSA. Later on, 
Qatar moved to support some of the radicalised groups such as Jabhat al-Nusrah (JAN). 
In addition to directly assisting and arming anti-Assad forces, Saudi financial support to these 
groups flows through private money that citizens are sending to Salafi charities and popular committees 
in Syria. One of the primary recipients of a donation from the Gulf is the Popular Commission to 
Support the Syrian people. The organisation has funnelled millions of dollars in funds and humanitarian 
aid to Salafi militias like Ahrar al-Sham; the money has been used to buy weapons and to buy local 
support. The degree of complicity of the Saudi government is open to debate. Although the Saudi 
government has implemented anti-terror financing laws to prevent any funds from reaching the  al-
Assad regime, no official action has been taken to stop charity funds from reaching the radical militias 
in the opposition.  
The final tool deployed by the Saudi government has been the ‘ideational’ support provided to 
the opposition. Saudi elites own Arab satellite television channels, such as Al-Arabiya, along with key 
newspapers, such as Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. Through these outlets, the Kingdom has 
promoted a particular narrative about the Syria crisis to their audience in the Sunni world, adopting an 
anti-Assad and anti-Iranian narrative. Saudi clerics have often promoted a sectarian narrative about the 
conflict, describing al-Assad as anti-Alawite and anti-Shiite, and some of them have even called for 
Jihad.75 These narratives have helped to amplify the self-proclaimed Saudi position as the guardian of 
Sunnis in the region.   
Changes in Saudi leadership in 2015 brought a new generation to power, which led to 
significant changes in the Kingdom’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, there were no major changes to 
Saudi policies in Syria. Saudi support for rebels has continued since then, and diplomatic efforts to 
overthrow Bashar al-Assad have persisted. Syria has, however, dropped in Saudi regional priorities with 
the launch of the Saudi led-coalition in Yemen in March 2015. Winning the war in Yemen has become 
the major priority of the Crown Prince Muhammed Bin Salman.76 
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It would be easy to assess Saudi policies in Syria as a failure to achieve its goals. Diplomatic 
and economic pressure exercised on Bashar al-Assad did not lead to his demise. The military and 
financial support given to the armed opposition groups has not produced remarkable military progress 
and has failed to persuade the US to intervene in Syria. Instead, the conflict in Syria has persisted, and 
al-Assad regime remains resilient. Like other international actors, Saudi Arabia miscalculated the 
resilience of the Syrian regime, which has successfully turned to Iran, Russia, and Hezbollah for 
survival. Saudi Arabia is by no means unique in its negative impact on the conflict. The other Gulf 
states, Russia, Iran, the European Union, and the United States have contributed to the exacerbation of 
the Syrian situation. It is, however, safe to say that the Saudi involvement has been particularly negative 
in a number of ways.  
 First, the Saudi policies in Syria have been impulsive and lacking in any grand strategy. This 
lack of strategic planning is evident in the hastily backing of armed groups without established 
intelligence, while tribal and private contacts have been the root of the relationship with the opposition 
groups. Consequently, the Saudi offered supplies of weapons and funding to groups (mostly FSA 
elements) which had little power on the ground and with no popular support.77 When these groups 
proved inefficient in achieving victory, the Saudis swiftly redirected their support to other more 
Salafist/jihadist groups. As a result, the Saudis in their support of rebel groups have failed to create 
successful patron-client relationships. They have only succeeded in creating unreliable and suspicious 
partnerships with non-state actors who are likely to be highly selective and opportunistic in their 
manoeuvres against al-Assad’s regime, lacking any ideological fervour or coherence. In short, the 
Saudis embarked on involvement in a conflict without having an adequate understanding of the political 
and religious diversity of the Syrian people and even without a strategy to manage it. This lack of 
strategy had a significant impact on the fragmentation of the opposition and its inability to forge a viable 
military action against al-Assad. 
 Second, in their struggle for recognition of the Kingdom’s supposed power-house status, the 
Saudis have preached sectarian discourses at domestic and regional levels. During the Syria crisis, this 
sectarian discourse has acquired a security dimension. The Kingdom portrayed the al-Assad regime as 
an existential threat that fostered Shiite encroachment in the region. Although this sectarianism has been 
promoted for instrumental political ends, it has been internalised and accepted at domestic and regional 
levels. Before 2011 and despite Saudi unsuccessful efforts in peeling Syria away from Iran, the Syrian 
regime was never identified as an enemy or a threat in Saudi narratives, but as a mere Arab rival, with 
which the Kingdom still shared interests in Lebanon and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.78 This 
discourse, however, underwent a significant change since the outbreak of the Syrian uprisings. In the 
Saudi narrative, the Syrian regime shifted from a mere rival to a Shiite enemy that poses an existential 
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threat to Sunni Islam in the region. By linking this sectarian discourse to a security dimension, the 
Saudis risked the sectarianization of the conflict while inflaming sectarian tensions in the Middle East. 
 Third, using violence and conflict to achieve recognition has far-reaching implications on the 
Syria crisis and the region. The Saudi involvement in the Syrian conflict led to a significant change in 
regional geography that will be difficult to reverse. As the scope of Saudi involvement is beyond the 
Kingdom’s capabilities, it is facing limits in both structuring the region or determining the course of 
developments in the way its leadership desires. This inability to achieve victory may make the Saudis 
more persistent in their efforts to prove that they are capable of influencing the region, which would 
only put the region in further disarray. 
Alongside the negative impact of Saudi involvement on the Syrian conflict, Saudi Arabia has 
put its own foreign policy at risk. The Saudis have put themselves into a precarious situation. While the 
Saudi goal has been to depose al-Assad as a means to win the Kingdom’s aspired recognition and 
respect, this pursuit of recognition may in the end prove self-destructive. The increased sectarian tone 
at the regional level may lead to domestic tensions between Sunni and Shiite communities in the Gulf 
as well as in the Kingdom. In addition, with the rise of radical Jihadist groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra 
and the Islamic State (IS), the Saudis fear a domestic blowback if members of these groups start 
operating in the Kingdom. Moreover, the conflict in Syria has taken on its own dynamics, making Saudi 
choices more complex. On the one hand, the Saudis aim to defeat radical groups, such as IS. On the 
other hand, they fear the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria after defeating it in Egypt. In short, 
the Saudis aim to ensure the demise of al-Assad in favour of a loyal alternative regime that is neither 
extremist (IS or Jabhat al-Nusra) nor Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, the Saudis are keen to 
contain the extent of jihadi and sectarian fervour and prevent these from destability the domestic sphere 
in the Kingdom. As the Saudi Kingdom remains desperate to fulfil its ambition to become the primary 
actor of Arab regional politics and be recognised as such, it is sowing the seeds of longstanding enmity 
and conflict in the Middle East. 
 
Conclusion 
Saudi Arabia’s policies toward the Syria crisis have evolved since 2011. Initially, Late King Abdullah 
has attempted to reshape al-Assad’s regional policies and pull him back away from Iran and back to the 
Arab sphere. As a result, the Saudi Kingdom encouraged al-Assad to adopt reforms. With al-Assad 
unwillingness to follow the Saudi lead, the Kingdom’s policy toward Syria became shaped by one 
objective, that is, to depose al-Assad and shift the country towards the Saudi Arabian orbit. This chapter 
has provided an explanation for this change in Saudi drivers towards the Syria crisis. It has argued that 
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this change in behaviour is related to a symbolic driver, that is, the struggle for Saudi recognition of its 
regional leadership in the region. As the Kingdom saw its military and financial capabilities rising in 
the last decades, it attempted to acquire a leadership status and get this status recognised by its other 
Arab states, especially in the context of regional competition with Iran.  
 As Saudi policies towards al-Assad regime evolved from encouraging to reform to 
overthrowing the regime, the Kingdom adopted a wide range of instruments, including diplomatic, 
military, and financial tactics. Since 2011, the Kingdom has maintained an active insurgency towards 
al-Assad. With the rise of a new leadership to power in 2015, the Kingdom’s policies in the Syria crisis 
have remained unchanged, even if Syria has droped in the Kingdom’s list of priorities as a result of the 
situation in Yemen. 
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